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Theresa May’s Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement 
Michael Emerson 
In examining May’s first attempt to operationally define the UK’s future trade relations with the 
EU, Michael Emerson finds that she draws heavily on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area model. 
In her 30-page speech on March 2nd, the British Prime Minister has at last set out much, but 
not all, of the substance so far lacking from the side of the UK. It would have been most suitable 
as a preliminary to the Article 50 declaration of a year ago. But better late than never. Also it 
was a welcome relief from the vacuous and totally inadequate speeches of the preceding days 
by ministers Boris Johnson and David Davies, billed as the Roadmap to Brexit.  
Reading between the lines of the Prime Minister’s speech, and setting aside the abundant 
political rhetoric, the text talks in terms that Brussels can understand. May now says that the 
UK wants a “Deep and Comprehensive Agreement”. Looking into the details of the speech, as 
we do below, it is evident that the Prime Minister is indeed heading towards the model of a 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) embedded within a broader 
Association Agreement (AA), for which the EU has developed a generic model that is applied 
with differences adapted to individual cases.  
Having made her speech, the Prime Minister is essentially saying to the EU “over to you in 
Brussels now”. Given the aim to achieve something under the heading of a Deep and 
Comprehensive Agreement, the Commission could rapidly prepare a draft comprehensive legal 
text as a basis for negotiation. The fact that the hundreds of pages of legal language have 
already been thrashed out on earlier occasions means that progress on the basis of these 
template materials could be much faster than is often suggested.  
The text of her speech calls for “the broadest and deepest possible partnership – covering more 
sectors and co-operating more fully than any Free Trade Agreement anywhere in the world 
today”. This wording is actually a pointless exaggeration, but not a matter of operational 
significance. And the Prime Minister’s continued rhetoric that there is ‘no relevant model’ is 
just political posturing. 
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The potentially operational parts of the speech can be presented along the following lines, 
which has a logical order that Brussels will recognise: 
1. Classic free-trade elements, namely no tariffs or quantitative restrictions, as found in any 
serious FTA (Free Trade Agreement), to which would be added other elements of basic 
trade law of the WTO under the headings of safeguards and trade remedies. 
2. For goods in industrial products, “we must ensure that, as now, products only need to 
undergo one series of approvals, in one country, to show they meet required regulatory 
standards”. There should be a comprehensive system of mutual recognition, presumably 
of conformity assessment procedures. It is said that many regulatory standards are 
“underpinned by international standards set by non-EU bodies”. It would be more 
accurate to say that many standards are set jointly by the European standards 
organisations and their international counterparts, of which the UK is and can continue 
to be full member in both cases. The exclusively ‘international’ language is chosen 
presumably to minimise criticism at home of the UK becoming a ‘vassal state’ of the EU.  
Given the Prime Minister’s stated concern of being able to have differing standards to 
achieve common desired outcomes, she could have also mentioned that EU practice 
allows for the possibility of differing technical standards so long as the “essential 
requirements” of the EU directive or regulation are met. This added technical detail is not 
without political significance. Thus, this whole chapter promises to be among the easiest 
to agree. 
3. For agri-food products, the UK will be leaving the Common Agricultural Policy, as is 
compatible with existing DCFTAs, but there will still be the issue of food safety (sanitary 
and phyto-sanitary – SPS) regulations on which the text is silent. It would need to be 
confirmed that these regulations would continue to be applied to permit frictionless 
trade in agri-food products in a manner analogous to that above for industrial goods. 
Given the UK’s apparent political allergy to chlorinated chicken from the United States, 
this chapter too seems not so difficult.  
4. For trade to be conducted on fair terms there should be “binding commitments” in “some 
areas of our regulations like state aid and competition to remain in step with the EU’s”. 
No problem. 
5. For services, the partnership “needs to be deeper than any other Free Trade Agreement 
… We should only allow new barriers to be introduced where absolutely necessary.” This 
will require an “appropriate labour mobility framework” for service providers. There 
should be continued mutual recognition of professional qualifications. There will be much 
detailed negotiation over this highly complex field. 
6. The agreement “will also need to cover intellectual property and company law to provide 
legal certainty and coherence”, also implying continued compliance with the EU acquis.  
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7. For labour laws and the environment, “the EU should be confident that we will not 
engage in a race to the bottom”. The EU may want its confidence to be buttressed by 
more binding commitments here.  
8. For financial services, the Prime Minister mainly says that the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
will set out next week how financial services should be “part of a deep and 
comprehensive partnership”, while recognising that this will be without passporting or 
the single rulebook. 
9. For broadcasting services, there should be a mutual recognition agreement. 
10. On energy, the UK wants to explore options to continue participation in the EU’s internal 
energy market, for which (but this is not mentioned) the Energy Community Treaty offers 
a model. 
11. On transport the UK “will want to ensure continuity on air, maritime, rail and road haulage 
services”, which will entail (but this is not mentioned) continued compliance with the EU 
acquis in this field.  
12. In the digital sector, however, the UK will not be part of the EU’s Digital Single Market, 
where it is “particularly important to have domestic flexibility”. Here the cherry-picking 
critique is likely to surface.   
13. On EU agencies, the UK will want to explore the conditions for remaining in some of them, 
with three mentioned specifically: the European Medicines Agency, the European 
Chemicals Agency and the European Civil Aviation Agency. These agencies are open in 
principle to neighbouring non-member states, but on condition that the EU’s acquis in 
these fields are complied with. 
14. The UK should participate in science and research programmes of the EU, as is already 
possible for non-member states, with appropriate financial contributions (GNP-based). 
No problem. 
15. Similarly, for the EU’s educational and cultural programmes, continued participation will 
be sought, again with financial contributions. No problem. 
16. This long catalogue (as set out more fully in the Annex) prompts questions about differing 
degrees of legally binding compliance with EU law, as opposed to softer cooperation. In 
general the strict DCFTA content (Title III) requires legally binding commitments. The long 
list of chapters under ‘’Economic and Sector Cooperation” (Title V) see greater flexibility 
however. For some chapters there are lists of EU laws with which the partner would 
normally remain compliant (e.g. environment, transport); in other cases there is provision 
for looser cooperation without legally binding commitments (e.g. agricultural policy); and 
others in which there is scope for cooperation but without obligation (e.g. participation 
in agencies and programmes). These different categories bear some resemblance to the 
terms of internal British debate under the so-called “three baskets” heading, i.e. groups 
of topics subject to different degrees of legally binding commitment. The EU itself already 
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in its Association Agreements engages in less simplistic absolutism in practice than is 
sometimes suggested or implied in ‘anti-cherry picking’ speeches. 
17. On legal enforcement, rather than total exclusion of the European Court of Justice, here 
too degrees of compromise emerge. In general terms, “we will need an arbitration 
mechanism that is completely independent”, for which the WTO and DCFTAs offer well-
known models. While leaving the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, “where 
appropriate, our courts will continue to look at the ECJ’s judgements…” And this will apply 
notably where “Parliament passes an identical law to an EU law”. Since all EU law will 
continue to apply upon withdrawal, unless repealed, this provision could have a large 
application for a long time. In addition, where the UK may continue to participate in EU 
agencies, the formulation is stricter, since “the UK would have to respect the remit of the 
ECJ in that regard”. 
18. The customs union (1). In general, the UK will leave the customs union and seek a 
partnership to assure “a frictionless border”. There is here only a repetition of the two 
options earlier suggested. The first would see a special arrangement whereby goods 
imported into the UK from third countries but intended for the EU market would be 
subjected to the EU’s tariffs and rules of origin by the UK customs authorities. This would 
“remove the need for customs processes at the UK-EU border”. The technical feasibility 
of this proposal has not been established. The second option would see a “highly 
streamlined customs arrangement”, with jointly agreed steps to minimise frictions to 
trade. There are possibilities along these lines open to non-member states that follow the 
Union Customs Code, but these and other ideas are not specified, beyond mention of 
“trusted traders” schemes and “the most advanced IT solutions”. It is said that these 
various measures should allow for continuity of the current practice within the EU, 
whereby declarations for goods moving across borders are not needed, but this sounds 
implausible (what about rules of origin declarations?). 
19. The customs union (2), for the Northern Ireland-Irish border. To avoid a “hard border”, 
two elements are proposed. The first concerns “smaller traders”, who would continue to 
operate without restrictions, as they do currently. The second, for “larger traders”, would 
consist of “streamlined processes, including a trusted traders scheme”. In the face of the 
logical impossibility of quitting the customs union without installing customs controls, the 
UK seems to be aiming at a degree of compromise, with minimal rather than zero border 
controls. The technical as well as political feasibility of such an arrangement remains to 
be ascertained.   
20. The customs union (3). These complicated and unverified ideas for special customs 
arrangements would of course be unnecessary if the UK stayed in the customs union. 
There are no reason legal or political reasons for the EU side why this could not be added 
to the standard DCFTA agenda, even if this has not yet been seen in practice. And this 
was the main point of the speech on 26 February by the leader of the opposition, Jeremy 
Corbyn, arguing in favour of staying in the customs union. The main objection to this has 
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been concern on the UK side to gain freedom to make free trade deals with countries 
with which the EU has no free trade agreement. The two overwhelmingly most significant 
cases in point are the US and China. Here the week’s other news sees Trump’s 
protectionist measures for steel and aluminium, coupled to his latest tweet that if the EU 
retaliated, he would want to escalate with punishing measures against EU motorcar 
exports to the US. As for China, there would be many hazards or impossibilities (e.g. China 
has never agreed to free trade in services with anyone).  
In short, any cost-benefit assessment of leaving the EU customs union looks increasingly 
unfavourable for the UK. And given the current thin majority held by the May government in 
the House of Commons, it is conceivable that it could be defeated in the coming weeks or 
months over excluding the UK’s continued membership in the customs union. Given also the 
unresolved Northern Irish question, there is clearly a scenario under which the Prime Minister 
could add to her agenda by retaining continued membership of the customs union, rather than 
face dissolution of parliament and a fresh general election.  
Overall, in the eyes of an observer from Brussels, the Prime Minister has now opted for a DCFTA 
model, with the following structural features (detailed in the Annex):  
a) large access to the single market, most completely for goods, but less so for services, with 
continued compliance with EU acquis where market access is sought;  
b) formal exclusion from the customs union, which however might be reversed; 
c) formal exclusion of free movement of people, but with facilitating measures;  
d) inclusion in various important EU agencies and programmes;  
e) budget contributions restricted to the costs of agencies and programmes; and 
f) the very substantial agenda for security and defence cooperation set out in the Prime 
Minister’s earlier speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 17th  
Usually the EU would be inclined to make a single comprehensive Treaty, namely an Association 
Agreement that would include a DCFTA.  
There are various points needing further clarification, and other points which, needless to say, 
will be subject to difficult negotiations. For the moment the main point is that in substance the 
UK is moving in the direction of an Association Agreement, including a DCFTA. To make this 
operational in practice will require a large amount of continued reliance on EU law and policy-
making, presumably more than would fit easily with the rhetoric of many Conservative MPs. 
While their response to the speech has been muted so far, the going may get rougher when 
the EU provides its detailed response. The Brexit hardliners however seem now to be on the 
defensive, since their greatest fear would be political discord leading to the scenario mentioned 
above of dissolution of parliament.  
One also has to take note of the two other major speeches delivered in the past week, by 
former Prime Ministers, Sir John Major of the Conservative party, and Tony Blair of the Labour 
Party. Both of these speeches conclude that it would be better to scrap the entire withdrawal 
process, or at least to subject it to a concluding vote of Parliament or a second referendum.   
6 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Annex 
Contents of the Association Agreement and DCFTA model 
The following presents what amounts to a standard template, as in the EU-Ukraine and other Association 
Agreements, in which details differ (as the Prime Minster says, all trade agreements are different), but which 
contains a well-established structure and a substantial amount of standard legal drafting.  
Titles I to III cover general political principles, foreign and security policy, and justice, freedom and security. These 
could readily build on Prime Minister May’s Munich speech of 17 February 2018. 
Title IV concerns trade policy and the formal content of the DCFTA, where most of the legally binding commitments 
would have to be made. Its chapters are: 
1. Market access for goods 
2. Trade remedies 
3. Technical barriers trade (i.e. standards for industrial products) 
4. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
5. Customs and trade facilitation 
6. Establishment, trade in services and electronic commerce 
7. Current payments and movement of capital 
8. Public procurement 
9. Intellectual property 
10. Competition 
11. Trade-related energy 
12. Transparency 
13. Trade and sustainable development 
14. Dispute settlement 
15. Mediation mechanism 
Title V concerns economic and sector cooperation. This has no less than 28 chapters where there is a much wider 
range of sectors, subject however to variable intensity of legally binding content. Chapters that correspond to the 
content of the Prime Minister’s speech include: 
1. Energy cooperation 
6.  Environment 
7. Transport 
9. Science and technology 
12. Financial services 
13. Company law 
15. Audio-visual policy 
17. Agriculture 
18. Fisheries 
19. Consumer protection 
20. Employment and social policy 
23. Education 
27. Cross-border and regional cooperation 
28. Participation in EU agencies and programmes  
 
Title VI concerns financial technicalities. 
 
Title VII mainly concerns institutional provisions, for which there are well-tested provisions for Association Councils 
and Joint Committees. 
